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Amici curiae submit this brief in support of the Commissioner urging the 
Court to affirm the Tax Court’s judgment.1 
IDENTITY OF AMICI, INTRODUCTION, AND  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The Amici are Roger Colinvaux, John Echeverria, John Leshy, Nancy 
McLaughlin, and Janet Milne, all professors who teach tax, nonprofit, property, 
land use, or natural resources law and have taught, lectured, and written about 
conservation easements.  Based on their professional knowledge and personal 
experience, they believe allowing a charitable deduction for the easement in this 
case would be contrary to the plain language of the statute, the legislative history, 
and the Treasury regulations, and would open the door to abusive transactions that 
would produce little or no conservation benefit at significant cost to taxpayers.  
Amici file this brief to highlight arguments that powerfully support the 
Commissioner and to bring broader legal and policy issues to the Court’s attention. 
The Belks claimed a $10.5 million charitable deduction under § 170(h) of 
the Internal Revenue Code for donating a conservation easement to a land trust 
even though the easement permits development of the land ostensibly protected by 
the easement.  Specifically, the easement allows the parties to engage in 
                                                          
1  No party’s counsel authored any part of this brief, and no party, party’s 
counsel, or other person besides Amici and their counsel contributed money to 
fund preparation or submission of this brief.  No disclosure statement is required 




“substitutions” or “swaps”  i.e,  to release land from the easement restrictions in 
exchange for placing easement restrictions on some other land—subject to certain 
conditions of the parties’ choosing.  The Commissioner appropriately disallowed 
the deduction, contending that easements that can “float” across the landscape at 
the parties’ discretion violate the requirements of § 170(h) and the regulations.  
The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner, agreeing that § 170(h) requires that a 
deductible use restriction relate to a particular parcel and not be allowed to float 
from parcel to parcel.     
Amici endorse the Tax Court’s position.  Section 170(h) allows a deduction 
for the donation of an easement that places perpetual restrictions on the use of the 
specific property that is the subject of the easement at the time of its donation.  The 
legislative history and regulations confirm that the perpetual restrictions must 
apply to “the interest in the property retained by the donor.”  S. Rep. No. 96-1007, 
C.B. 599, at 605 (1980-82); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1).  There is one narrow 
exception: easement restrictions on the original property can be extinguished and 
replaced with restrictions on other property if changed conditions make 
“impossible or impractical” continued use of the original property for conservation 
purposes, the extinguishment is approved by a court, and the holder receives at 
least a minimum proportionate share of proceeds from the subsequent sale or 




substitutions authorized by the Belk easement, which involve the extinguishment 
and replacement of restrictions, do not fit within this exception.  Accordingly, the 
easement is not eligible for a charitable deduction.  
Furthermore, the Belks’ position, if accepted, would undermine the 
conservation utility of easements and waste taxpayer dollars by granting the parties 
broad discretion to lift easement restrictions off properties whenever they constrain 
development, leading to the destruction of the conservation values identified as 
worthy of protection when the easements were donated.  It also would be 
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for the Commissioner to police whether 
post-donation “substitutions” involve interests in land with equivalent financial and 
conservation values. 
ARGUMENT   
 
I.      The Internal Revenue Code, Legislative History, and Treasury 
Regulations Confirm that Floating Easements Are Not Entitled to 
Federal Tax Subsidies.   
 
 A party challenging a determination by the Commissioner to disallow a tax 
deduction bears the burden of showing the Commissioner erred.  Welch v. 
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).  Any reasonable reading of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the pertinent legislative history, and the regulations shows that a 
taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction for an easement that can “float.”    




A. The Statute   
The plain language of § 170(h) contradicts the Belks’ theory.  To constitute 
a “qualified conservation contribution” under § 170(h)(1), the contribution must be 
(A) of “a qualified real property interest,” (B) to “a qualified organization,” and 
(C) “exclusively for conservation purposes.”  The main issue in this case is 
whether the Belks made a contribution of “a qualified real property interest.”2  The 
Belks contended that they met the qualified real property interest requirement 
because they contributed “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which 
may be made of the real property.”  § 170(h)(2)(C).  The Tax Court correctly 
rejected this position. 
By requiring that a contribution constitute “a qualified real property 
interest,” in the form of “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may 
be made of the real property” (emphases added), § 170(h)(2)(C) indicates that an 
easement donation must place permanent legal restrictions on the use of a specific 
property, not simply any property.  Use of the word “a” in the phrase “a qualified 
real property interest” as well as in the phrase “a restriction” naturally suggests a 
restriction on a specific stick in the bundle of sticks associated with a specific 
                                                          
2  While it was uncontested that the Belks’ contribution was made to a 
“qualified organization,” the Commissioner disputed that the contribution was 
made “exclusively for conservation purposes.”  The Tax Court did not consider 
that issue.  See Belk v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 1, 8 n.12 (2013).  Amici agree that the 




parcel of property.  More to the point, use of the word “the” in § 170(h)(2)(C) 
indicates that the donation of the qualified real property interest must ensure 
perpetual protection of the specific property on which the donor placed the 
easement.  If Congress had wished to adopt the Belks’ position—that the 
restriction need not relate to a specific parcel—it would have omitted “the,” or it 
might have substituted the word “any” for the word “the.”  But Congress did 
neither.  Instead, it used language indicating that a deduction is available only for 
perpetual restrictions fixed to “the” specific parcel of land. 
Other language in § 170(h) bolsters this plain meaning of § 170(h)(2)(C).  
Section 170(h)(1)(C) requires that the contribution be “exclusively for 
conservation purposes.”  Section 170(h)(5)(A) defines “exclusively for 
conservation purposes” in part, by stating that a “contribution shall not be treated 
as exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is 
protected in perpetuity.”  Reading § 170(h)(2)(C) and § 170(h)(5)(A) together, a 
taxpayer is eligible for a deduction only if the restrictions on use are perpetually 
affixed to a specific property in order to achieve a permanent conservation goal.  
The legislative history and regulations, discussed below, also confirm this reading.   
Both provide that the perpetual restrictions must apply to the specific property 




The Belks seek to rebut this straightforward reading of § 170(h) by pointing 
out that the regulations authorize extinguishment of conservation easements in the 
event of changed circumstances.  (Belk Brief, at 20).  They argue that the authority 
to extinguish an easement in the event of impossibility or impracticality precludes 
the conclusion that § 170(h) requires perpetual protection of specific property.  But 
the extinguishment regulation does not contradict the statute.  It simply reflects the 
practical reality that continuing to protect the conservation values of a property 
will sometimes become impossible or impractical due to changed conditions, that 
the easement will be subject to extinguishment by a court in such circumstances, 
and that a mechanism was needed to protect the public investment in this 
unfortunate (and rare) eventuality.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6). 
 For comparison, under the contract law doctrine of impossibility, the 
obligation to carry out a contract is excused if performance becomes impossible.  
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1981).  But the fact that contract 
obligations may be excused under the doctrine of impossibility does not mean that 
contracts are unenforceable absent impossibility.  Just as the reality of 
impossibility can be read into the law of contracts without destroying the sanctity 
of contract obligations in general, so too impossibility can be read into § 170(h) 
without destroying the requirement that only donations of easements that 




B. Legislative History  
 1. Senate Report 
The legislative history of § 170(h) supports this reading of the statute.  The 
Senate Finance Committee Report on the Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980 
provides detailed guidance on what Congress intended when it adopted § 170(h) in 
1980.  S. Rep. No. 96-1007, C.B. 599 (1980-82).  It states that a deductible 
conservation easement “must involve legally enforceable restrictions on the 
interest in the property retained by the donor that would prevent uses of the 
retained interest inconsistent with the conservation purposes.”  Id. at 605 
(emphasis added).  The report’s explicit reference to restrictions on “the interest in 
the property retained by the donor” indicates that the committee contemplated that 
taxpayers would be eligible for deductions for placing restrictions on specific 
property, not simply any land.   
 Other passages from the report reinforce the conclusion that Congress 
intended to allow deductions only for permanent restrictions attached to specific 
property.  The report explains that the committee intended to subsidize easement 
donations that would “further significant conservation goals without presenting 
significant potential for abuse.”  Id. at 603.  As discussed in more detail below, 
allowing the parties to move easements across the landscape in unregulated and 





 The committee report also emphasizes that strict standards apply when 
determining the types of properties eligible for conservation tax subsidies, 
standards that would be seriously eroded if easements could “float” from parcel to 
parcel.  The report states that “deductions for conservation easements should be 
directed at the preservation of unique or otherwise significant land areas or 
structures.”  Id. at 603.  To ensure that only qualifying easements receive 
deductions, the committee expressed its “expectation” that taxpayers could obtain 
“prior administrative determination[s]” on whether their donations would qualify.  
Id. at 605.  Such determinations are based on detailed analyses of the attributes of 
the specific properties that will be the subject of the easements.  See, e.g., I.R.S. 
P.L.R. 200836014 (Sept. 5, 2008).  The committee also said it expected Treasury 
to make publication of regulations interpreting § 170(h) a “highest priority.”  S. 
Rep. No. 96-1007, C.B. 599, at 605 (1980-82).  These expressions of concern 
about the need to ensure that only eligible conservation easements protecting 
specific properties receive tax subsidies would have been nonsensical if the 
committee contemplated that the parties could, after the initial donations, move the 
restrictions across the landscape at their discretion. 
 Finally, the committee’s instructions regarding the narrow circumstances in 




authorize deductions for easements that permit “substitutions.”  Substitutions 
involve the transfer of some or all of the easement restrictions back to the donor or 
subsequent owner of the land in exchange for replacement restrictions on some 
other land.  However, the report states that deductions should be limited to 
easements that “require that the donee (or successor in interest) hold the 
conservation easement … exclusively for conservation purposes.”  Id. at 606.  The 
report explains that a qualified organization that receives an easement donation 
should be permitted to transfer the easement only to another qualified organization, 
and only so long as the transferee organization “also will hold the perpetual 
restriction … exclusively for conservation purposes.”  Id.  These instructions make 
it clear that the committee did not intend for donees to have the power to freely 
transfer easements back to the donors or subsequent property owners through 
swaps. 
2. Extinguishment 
The legislative history regarding when a perpetual easement might be 
extinguished further highlights that deductible easements must be linked to specific 
properties.  Congress was aware that, in rare cases, circumstances might change so 
dramatically that it becomes impossible or impractical for an easement to continue 
to serve the purposes for which it was donated and, in such cases, a court could 




§ 170(h), the Joint Committee on Taxation prepared a report that raised the issue of 
whether § 170(h) ought to include rules to cover the situation “where a transferred 
partial interest in real property, for which a deduction was allowed because it 
served a conservation purpose, ceases to be used in furtherance of the conservation 
purpose.”  See Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 96th Cong., Description of Misc. 
Tax Bills Scheduled for Hearing before Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of 
Comm. on Ways & Means June 26, 1980, JCS-33-80, at 27 (Comm. Print 1980).  
In response to this report, the president of a land trust, on behalf of nineteen land 
trusts, provided the following testimony: 
A question raised in the Joint Committee Description . . . is: should 
rules be provided to take care of the remote contingency that at some 
time in the future a property subject to a conservation easement might 
cease to be used for that conservation purpose?   
We believe that with a well-planned easement program this is most 
unlikely to occur, but it is not impossible. It is conceivable for 
example, that a farm, or a natural habitat, might become so closely 
surrounded by heavy industry at some future time that it would 
become impossible to continue the original conservation purpose. In 
the such situation the then owner of the land might, under common 
law “change of circumstances” doctrine, obtain equitable relief from 
the burden of the easement in court. Certainly if that were to happen 
equity would seem to call for a return to the public of the price 
originally paid for the public benefit provided by the easement, 
whether that price had been paid directly by purchase or indirectly by 
a tax deduction. It also seems very difficult, however, to provide for 
this unlikely occurrence in the Revenue Code itself. We would hope 
that some Regulation for this purpose could be developed by those 
most interested, i.e., The Revenue Service and the Treasury 






Minor Tax Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of 
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 245 (1980) (statement of Samuel 
Morris, President, French and Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust).  Congress 
accepted the advice offered in this testimony and did not include standards and 
procedures governing extinguishment of conservation easements in light of 
changed circumstances in § 170(h), leaving it to Treasury to address the issue in 
regulations.  Treasury did so by incorporating a version of the doctrine of cy pres 
into the regulations.  Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6); Kaufman v. Comm’r, 136 
T.C. No. 13, *9 (2011), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Kaufman v. 
Shulman, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 The critical point for present purposes is that Congress carefully considered 
how best to address the “unlikely occurrence” of extinguishment of a conservation 
easement in the event its purpose becomes impossible due to changed conditions. 
This precludes the notion that Congress contemplated that easements could be 
freely extinguished at the parties’ discretion, as the Belks suggest. 
3. State Law 
The legislative history also shows that Congress had a clear understanding of 
state law governing charitable contributions and intended the tax code to be 




conservation easement are free under state law to agree to substitutions even if the 
easement does not authorize substitutions.  (See Belk Brief at 9-10, 33).  That 
assertion is not correct.  Donated conservation easements are, by definition, 
charitable gifts, and under state law charitable gifts must be administered in 
accordance with their terms and purposes.  See, e.g., Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo 2012-1 (the tax-deductible conservation easements are “restricted 
[charitable] gifts” under state law, that is, “contributions conditioned on the use of 
a gift in accordance with the donor’s precise directions and limitations.”) (citation 
omitted); Carl J. Herzog Found. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 997–98 
(Conn. 1997) (“equity will afford protection to a donor to a charitable corporation 
in that the attorney general may maintain a suit to compel the property to be held 
for the charitable purpose for which it was given”) (quoting Lefkowitz v. 
Lebensfeld, 68 A.D. 2d 488, 494-95 (N.Y. 1979)).  See also Unif. Conservation 
Easement Act, Prefatory Note and § 3 cmt. (2007) (discussing application of 
charitable principles to conservation easements); Unif. Trust Code § 414(e), cmt. 
(2000) (same).  Accordingly, contrary to the Belks’ assertion, the parties to a tax-
deductible easement should not be free to engage in substitutions under state law.  
Rather, the holder should have a duty to enforce the easement with regard to the 
specific property in accordance with its terms.  




§ 170(h).  At congressional hearings on proposed § 170(h), and in response to 
Treasury’s concern that conservation organizations might not properly enforce 
easements, nineteen land trusts submitted testimony in which they acknowledged 
the status of tax-deductible easements as “charitable grants” and noted the power 
and duty of state courts and state attorneys general to enforce such grants.  See 
Minor Tax Bills: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of H. 
Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 242 (1980) (App. to Testimony of French 
and Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust, the Brandywine Conservancy, and other 
Conservation Organizations re H.R. 7318 on June 26, 1980).  Congress thus 
imposed the requirement that a tax-deductible easement constitute a restriction on 
use, granted in perpetuity, with regard to a specific parcel of property with the 
understanding that the perpetual restriction should be legally binding on both 
parties under state law.  In other words, Congress anticipated that state law would 
be consistent with its intent to provide deductions with respect to conservation 
easements that would permanently protect specific properties.3  
                                                          
3    The Belks cite Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, § 4.8(3) to 
support their assertion that parties to an easement can freely agree to substitutions, 
Belk Brief at 34, n. 6, reflecting a gross misunderstanding of the Restatement’s 
position on conservation easements.  “Conservation servitudes” are separately 
defined in the Restatement and afforded “special protections” given the public 
interest and substantial public investment.  Restatement § 1.6 cmt. b (2000).  Most 
importantly, § 7.11 applies a special set of rules that are based on the doctrine of cy 




4. Partial Interest Status 
 Considering the history of § 170(h) in a broader context, it is important to 
recognize that Congress authorized charitable deductions for conservation 
easement donations despite its general distaste for deductions for contributions of 
partial interests in property.  Donations of partial interests are disfavored because 
they often involve abusive arrangements where donors retain extensive control 
over the property and the public receives little benefit from the donation.  In 1969, 
Congress adopted a general prohibition on deductions for contributions of partial 
interests, Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201, and it has kept this 
general prohibition in place ever since.  § 170(f)(3)(A). 
Congress made an exception to this general prohibition for easement 
donations when it enacted §170(h) in 1980, but it imposed strict limits on the 
deduction because of the significant potential for abuse.  See Stephen J. Small, The 
Federal Tax Law of Conservation Easements § 14.02, 2-2 to -3 (4th ed. 1997) (“As 
far as Congress … [was] concerned, a taxpayer who donates an easement continues 
to use and enjoy the property, and the requirements for taking an income tax 
deduction simply must be tighter to ensure that there is also a significant long-term 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
servitudes held by governmental or charitable entities.  Restatement § 7.11 cmts. b 
& c (2000).  These special protections are completely inconsistent with the notion 





public benefit associated with the donation.”).  The Tax Court’s ruling in Belk 
upholds the important limits Congress placed on the deduction to protect against 
abuse.  
5. Temporary Easements Rejected 
The conclusion that Congress never contemplated that easements could float 
from one property to another is further supported by the fact that, prior to adopting 
the 1980 legislation, Congress briefly experimented with the idea of allowing 
deductions for donations of easements that were temporary in nature, but quickly 
gave up on the experiment as wasteful of taxpayer dollars and ill-advised as a 
matter of conservation policy.  The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 
provided the first statutory authority for charitable deductions for conservation 
easement donations and authorized deductions for the donation of both perpetual 
easements and term easements with a minimum term of 30 years. 
Land conservation groups such as The Nature Conservancy expressed 
concern that term easements would not effectively promote conservation goals.  
They believed term easements would be more likely, in the long run, to lead to the 
destruction of natural areas than to their permanent protection.  See Stephen J. 
Small, The Tax Benefits of Donating Easements on Scenic and Historic Property, 7 




of deductions for term easements would discourage the donation of perpetual 
conservation easements.  Id. at 304, 306.   
Providing a deduction for term easements was also ill-advised from a tax 
policy standpoint because it created an expensive subsidy for taxpayers making 
long-term investments in land held for eventual development.  Under the 1976 
legislation, an investor making a 30-year investment in land on the urbanizing 
fringe of a metropolitan region could receive a deduction for donating an easement 
that would do little or nothing to advance conservation goals, given that the 
investor did not intend to develop the land for thirty years in any event.  Such a 
deduction would merely reduce the carrying costs of this type of investment. 
Accordingly, Congress quickly dropped the idea of temporary easements 
one year later, in 1977, and established a strict perpetuity requirement.  Act of May 
23, 1977, Pub. L. 95-30.  Congress then stuck to this policy when it enacted  
§ 170(h) in 1980 and has abided by it since.  The Belks’ request that the Court 
interpret § 170(h) as providing a deduction for the donation of temporary 
easements runs headlong into Congress’s carefully considered judgment to reject 
that option and require permanent protection of specific parcels. 
C. Regulations    
Finally, the Treasury regulations emphatically support the Commissioner’s 




float.  The regulations confirm what both the statute and the legislative history 
teach: to qualify for a deduction, easement restrictions must permanently attach to 
the specific property on which the donor placed the restrictions for the purpose of 
claiming the deduction.  
In the case of any donation under this section, any interest in the property 
retained by the donor (and the donor’s successors in interest) must be 
subject to legally enforceable restrictions (for example, by recordation in the 
land records in the jurisdiction in which the property is located) that will 
prevent uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the conservation 
purposes of the donation. 
 
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (emphases added).  The emphasized phrases 
demonstrate that, to be eligible for a deduction, the perpetual restrictions that 
protect conservation values must attach to the specific property on which the donor 
placed the restrictions, not any property anywhere.  Thus, the regulations, on their 
face, preclude floating easements. 
 Other provisions of the regulations are consistent with and support this 
conclusion.  The regulations closely track the advice and direction provided in the 
Senate Finance Committee’s report discussed above. 
 With respect to “transfers,” the regulations pronounce a general rule that “[a] 
deduction shall be allowed for a contribution under this section only if in the 
instrument of conveyance the donor prohibits the donee from subsequently 




§ 1.170A-14(c)(2).  The regulations identify two exceptions to the no-transfer rule.  
First, a donee may transfer an easement to another “eligible donee” provided the 
donee requires, as a condition of any such transfer, “that the conservation purposes 
which the contribution was originally intended to advance continue to be carried 
out.”  Second, a transfer is allowed in the context of an extinguishment when “a 
later unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the property” makes 
“impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for conservation 
purposes” and “the property is sold and or exchanged and any proceeds are used by 
the donee organization in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of 
the original contribution.”  The regulations also make clear that such an 
extinguishment can only be authorized by “judicial proceeding” and with a 
payment of a specified minimum proportionate share of proceeds to the holder.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6).4 
These exceptions, which are the only exceptions to the no-transfer rule, 
logically preclude the floating easement theory—that easement restrictions can be 
extinguished (i.e., transferred back to the donor or a subsequent owner of the 
                                                          
4  The operative provision governing extinguishment is regulation §1.170A-
14(g)(6).  Regulation §1.170A-14(c)(2) merely provides that an extinguishment 
that satisfies the extinguishment regulation requirements will not violate the 
restriction-on-transfer requirements.  The cross-reference to “(g)(5)(ii)” in the last 
sentence of regulation §1.170A-14(c)(2) should be to “(g)(6)(ii).”  See Proposed 





property) and replaced with restrictions on some other property at the parties’ 
discretion.  The first exception allows an easement on a particular piece of property 
to be transferred from one eligible donee to another.  The second exception permits 
an easement to be extinguished and replaced with restrictions on another property 
only if continued use of the original property for conservation purposes has 
become impossible or impractical due to changed conditions, the extinguishment is 
approved by a court, and the holder receives a minimum proportionate share of 
proceeds as specified in the extinguishment regulation.  The Belks’ interpretation 
of § 170(h) would render the restriction-on-transfer and extinguishment regulations 
superfluous, contrary to basic rules of construction.  See Corley v. United States, 
556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009). 
Other regulatory provisions likewise reinforce the conclusion that the 
easement restrictions must apply to a particular property.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 
1.170A-14(g)(5)(i) (“the donor must [generally] make available to the donee … 
documentation sufficient to establish the condition of the property at the time of 
the gift.  Such documentation is designed to protect the conservation interests 
associated with the property, which although protected in perpetuity by the 
easement, could be adversely affected by the exercise of the reserved rights.”) 
(emphasis added); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (“No deduction will be permitted 




subordinates its rights in the property to the right of the qualified organization to 
enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity.”) (emphasis added); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(ii) (“the terms of the donation must provide a right 
of the donee to enforce the conservation restrictions …, including … the right to 
require the restoration of the property to its condition at the time of the donation.”)  
(emphasis added).  
II.  Neither Simmons Nor Kaufman Supports Tax Deductions for Floating 
Easements.   
 
The Belks rely on two decisions involving façade easement donations, 
Comm’r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and Kaufman v. Shulman, 687 
F.3d. 21 (1st Cir. 2012), to support their theory that § 170(h) authorizes deductions 
for floating easements.  These decisions do not support the Belks.5 
 Both cases involved donations of façade easements that granted the holder 
the right “to give its consent (e.g., to changes in a Façade) or to abandon some or 
all of its rights” under the easement.  Simmons at 8.  In both cases the government 
argued that this clause made the taxpayers ineligible for deductions.  In both cases 
the courts ruled for the taxpayers, with the First Circuit in Kaufman following the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Simmons. 
                                                          
5    Amici doubt that either Simmons or Kaufman was correctly decided, but the 
Court need not resolve that question to conclude that the decisions, neither of 
which represents binding precedent in this Circuit, do not provide apposite or 




These cases do not support the Belks’ floating easement theory for several 
reasons. First, neither case addressed whether a deduction could be taken for a 
floating easement, and neither addressed the qualified real property interest 
requirement or the regulations dealing with transfers and extinguishment that are 
so significant to the resolution of this case.  
Second, the rulings in Simmons and Kaufman were based largely on factors 
totally unrelated to this case, including (1) a regulation applicable only to historic 
preservation easements that permits deductions if the easements require any future 
development to “conform with appropriate local, state, or Federal standards for 
construction or rehabilitation,” Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(5)(i), (2) the fact that 
the relevant local governments had established such standards, and (3) the fact that 
the easements specified that any work done on the subject historic structures had to 
comply with such standards, regardless of whether the holder consented.  See 
Comm’r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  See also Simmons v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo 2009-208 at 2.  On these special facts, the D.C. Circuit explained, “any 
change in the façade to which [the holder] might consent would have to comply 
with all applicable laws and regulations, including the District’s historic 
preservation laws.”  646 F.3d at 11.  Thus, “the donated easements will prevent in 





By contrast, the regulations applicable to easements other than historic 
preservation easements do not permit deductions if the easements require any 
future development to conform to appropriate local, state, or Federal standards. 
Outside of the historic preservation context, there is no backstop of local, state, or 
Federal standards to ensure that any changes to an easement will be consistent with 
the protection of the subject property’s conservation values.  Thus, the special legal 
rules at issue Simmons and Kaufman have no relevance to this case. 
Finally, the decision in Simmons makes clear that the D.C. Circuit did not 
endorse the notion that conservation easements can be swapped.  The court stated 
that “[Ms.] Simmons’s deeds in particular make express [the land trust’s] intention 
to ensure her properties ‘remain essentially unchanged.’”  646 F.3d. at 10 
(emphasis added).  The court further explains that “any change in the façade to 
which [the land trust] might consent would have to comply with all applicable laws 
and regulations, including the District’s historic preservation laws,” and, thus, the 
terms of “the donated easements will prevent in perpetuity any changes to the 
properties inconsistent with conservation purposes.”  Id. at 11 (emphasis added).   
These statements indicate that the D.C. Circuit contemplated that the easements 
would prevent, in perpetuity, any changes to the particular properties encumbered 
by the easements that would be inconsistent with the easements’ conservation 




discretion of the parties and floated to some new buildings elsewhere. 
The Tax Court has repeatedly and appropriately rejected invitations by 
taxpayers to interpret Simmons and Kaufman expansively.  See Mitchell v. 
Comm’r, 138 T.C. No. 16 (2012) (distinguishing Simmons); Mitchell v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo 2013-204 (distinguishing Kaufman); Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo 2013-172 (distinguishing Kaufman); Belk v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2013-154 
(distinguishing Simmons).  Simply put, the holdings in Simmons and Kaufman are 
fact-specific and cannot logically be applied to excuse failures to comply with 
statutory and regulatory requirements that were not analyzed in those cases.  
III.  Adoption of Taxpayer’s Theory Would Foment the Abuse Congress 
Sought to Avoid by Requiring that Easements Permanently Restrict 
Development of Specific Properties.   
 
 Adoption of the Belks’ position would lead to precisely the kind of waste of 
taxpayer dollars and anemic conservation benefits that Congress sought to avoid 
over thirty years ago when it mandated that tax-deductible conservation easements 
protect the conservation values of specific properties in perpetuity. 
  As discussed, Congress repudiated the idea of granting tax deductions for 
temporary conservation easements based on the concern that such an approach 
would undermine the goal of conservation and waste taxpayer dollars.  The very 
evils Congress sought to avoid by closing the temporary-easement loophole would 




the Belks’ position, any time an easement threatens to serve its intended purpose 
by actually constraining the development of land, the donor, with the concurrence 
of a willing land trust, could eliminate the constraint by shifting the easement to 
some other land not currently slated for development.  If at some future time the 
relocated easement constricted some new development, that easement could be 
relocated to yet another property.  And so on ad infinitum.  The upshot would be 
that the tax benefit provided for the donated easement might ultimately serve no 
valuable conservation purpose by actually restricting development.  While the 
Belks propose to place substitute restrictions on contiguous land they own, there is 
nothing in their theory that would require such a limitation. 
To be sure, at all times a legal restriction would rest someplace on the 
landscape, providing theoretical protection of conservation values.  But since the 
restrictions could be moved out of the way of proposed development at any time to 
suit the interests of the landowner, the tax subsidy would, in reality, provide little 
or no public benefit in exchange for the tax expenditure. 
In addition, the conservation benefits associated with easements would be 
severely compromised if easement restrictions could be moved about the 
landscape.  Under the terms of the Belks’ easement, restrictions on the substitute 
property would supposedly have equivalent economic and conservation value to 




inevitably be in the eyes of the beholder.  There would be a serious risk that the 
substitute easement would have less public value than the original easement.  
While the original charitable donor might have an incentive to try to create a 
substitute easement of equivalent conservation and economic value, there is no 
reason to suppose subsequent owners would have the same proclivities and, in fact, 
the opposite would likely be true. 
 Moreover, transferability of easement restrictions as the Belks suggest 
would severely undermine the statutory and regulatory requirements governing the 
deduction, which are designed to ensure that only “unique or otherwise significant 
land areas or structures” receive conservation subsidies and that the conservation 
values of those properties are protected in perpetuity.  To make an easement 
contribution eligible for a deduction, the taxpayer must, among many other things, 
prepare “baseline” documentation of the status of the property at the time of the 
donation to facilitate enforcement, see Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i), obtain a 
subordination agreement from any lender holding a mortgage on the property to 
protect the easement from extinguishment in a foreclosure, see Treas. Reg. § 
1.170A-14(g)(2), and comply with detailed conservation easement-specific 
valuation rules, see Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3).  Under the floating easement 
theory, new restrictions imposed on new properties would be created in a vacuum 




apply.  In addition, none of the indirect policing that occurs as part of the Internal 
Revenue Service’s tax return review and audit process in connection with the 
original easement donations would apply.  Congress could not have intended to 
make compliance with § 170(h)’s detailed statutory and regulatory requirements at 
the time of donation a pointless exercise by allowing compliant restrictions to be 
traded out for restrictions that are not subject to the same strict requirements the 
following day.  
The Belks assert that the public interest is protected because the substitutions 
require the concurrence of the land trust.  But Congress specifically did not grant 
the qualified organizations eligible to accept easement donations the power to 
engage in substitutions.  Instead, Congress mandated that easements be granted in 
perpetuity with respect to specific properties and that the qualified organizations 
be, among other things (1) required to hold the easements exclusively for 
conservation purposes and (2) prohibited from transferring the easements except to 
other qualified organizations that also will hold them exclusively for conservation 
purposes.  S. Rep. No. 96-1007, C.B. 599, at 606 (1980-82).  Because of the 
significant potential for abuse in this partial interest donation context, Congress 
demanded far more protection of what has grown to be a multi-billion dollar 




IV.    Adoption of Taxpayer’s Position Would Transform the Traditional 
Understanding of Tax Deductible Perpetual Easements.    
 
 Adoption of the Belks’ position would transform taxpayer-subsidized land 
conservation as it has long been practiced and understood in the United States.  
Landowners have donated thousands of conservation easements to ensure perpetual 
protection of specific lands that have special personal significance to them, their 
families, and their communities.  The Nature Conservancy, the nation’s largest 
land trust, explains: 
Often landowners have no intention of subdividing their properties for 
development. But a conservation easement is still attractive to them because 
it reaches beyond their own lifetimes to ensure the conservation purposes are 
met forever. An easement binds heirs and other future landowners to comply 
with the easement’s terms…. It can give peace-of-mind to current 
landowners worried about the future of a beloved property, whether forest or 
ranch, stretch of river or family farm. 
 
Conservation Easements, In Perpetuity, http://www.nature.org/about-us/private-
lands-conservation/conservation-easements/all-about-conservation-easements.xml. 
In a similar vein, the Jackson Hole Land Trust explains: 
Easements are donated or sold by the landowner to the land trust, which then 
has the authority and obligation to enforce the terms of the easement in 
perpetuity. When a parcel of land is placed under easement, the landowner 
still owns the property, which remains freely transferable, but the easement 
stays with the land forever.  
 
Conserve Your Land, http://jhlandtrust.org/land-protection/conserve-your-land/.  




With each conservation success comes a deep and permanent responsibility: 
we have promised to look after, or steward, the conservation protections 
placed on this land forever. 
 
Stewardship: A Perpetual Commitment to Conservation, http://www.vlt.org/land-
stewardship. 
Assurances of perpetual protection of specific parcels of land have served as 
a powerful incentive in the growth of the land conservation movement in the 
United States over the last several decades.  Amici submit that the preservation of 
this traditional understanding of the nature of the perpetual conservation easement 
is essential to protect both the legitimate expectations of conservation easement 
donors and the substantial public investment in tax deductible easements. 
The Belks argue that the Tax Court’s interpretation of § 170(h)(2)(C) to 
preclude a deduction for floating easements is “novel, overbroad, and 
unsupported.”  (Belk Brief at 14).  However, it is the Belks’ interpretation that fits 
that description.  It is not surprising that some landowners and even some land 
trusts may seek to take advantage of the federal subsidies for land conservation 
while avoiding the conditions attached to these subsidies to protect the public 
interest.  The importance of this case lies in the fact that the Court’s ruling will 
either arrest this destructive, ill-advised line of thinking, or greatly accelerate its 




As conservation easements age and properties change hands, new owners 
will commonly find themselves in a situation of conflict with the holders of the 
easements.  New owners of easement-encumbered land will often have a strong 
economic interest in seeking to free themselves of the constraints imposed by the 
easements.  Under current law, a responsible land trust presented with a proposal to 
lift easement restrictions from one property in exchange for placing an easement 
on some other land has a ready answer: such a transfer is prohibited by § 170(h) 
and the governing regulations.  But if this Court were to reverse the Tax Court’s 
decision, even well-meaning land trusts would be subject to relentless pressure 
from landowners seeking to lift easement restrictions in exchange for the 
protection of ostensibly equivalent land in unsupervised and unregulated 
transactions.  Both the cause of land conservation and the American taxpayer 
would end up the losers. 
CONCLUSION 
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